.. the higher education or the tertiary education. As well, the author was able to find RA 8292 which is another relevant act to the research and is known as the Higher Education Modernization Act of 1997. The problems encountered in the search was the lack of resources available regarding the CHED. The CHED being enacted just 1994 made it impossible to find sufficient resources in the library as the author found that the resources available in the library was mostly outdated and does not cover the new provisions provided for the CHED.
Fortunately, because of the internet the author was able to find the sufficient resources needed and will be able to start writing the paper. V. Statement of Issues The main issue of this case is whether or not the order to prohibit the increase of tuition fee by the Commission on Higher Education is valid. However, before the main issue will be resolved, it must first be shown whether or not the power on Higher Education of the Department of Education for Culture and Sports was indeed transferred to the Commission of Higher Education and thus giving CHED the authority to regulate tuition fees. VI. Discussion of Issues A. Whether or not the power on Higher Education of the Department of Education for Culture and Sports was indeed transferred to the Commission of Higher Education.
In determining whether the power of DECS on governing tertiary education was indeed transferred to the CHED, the provisions on RA 7722 should be closely examined. It is important that this issue be established because this will determine whether CHED has the power to issue such order and later on, allow to determine whether the order was indeed valid. In examining the provisions of RA 7722 specifically SEC. 18, there was indeed the transfer of power from the DECS to the CHED in governing the tertiary education. Sec. 18 is as follow: Transitory Provisions- Such personnel, properties, assets, and liabilities, functions and responsibilities of the Bureau of Higher Education, including those for higher and tertiary education and degree-granting vocational and technical programs in the regional offices, under the Department of Education, Culture and Sports, and other government entities having functions similar to those of the Commission are hereby transferred to the Commission.
The Commission shall have the authority to appoint its own personnel. All regular or permanent employees transferred to the Commission shall not suffer any loss of seniority or rank or decrease in emoluments. Personnel of the Bureau of Higher Education not otherwise transferred to the Commission shall be reassigned by the DECS in any of its office and bureaus: Provided, however, That, any employee who cannot be accommodated shall be given all the benefits as may be provided under existing laws, rules and regulations Jurisdiction over DECS-supervised or chartered state-supported post-secondary degree-granting vocational and technical programs and tertiary institutions shall be transferred to the Commission. In the Section excerpted above, it is basically discussing the powers that are being transferred to the CHED by the DECS. It specifically states that the governing power of DECS on tertiary education will be transferred to the CHED thereby giving the CHED the same power as the DECS had on the tertiary education or Higher education.
Furthermore, the section enumerates the delegation of the worker due to the enactment on CHED. The provisions clearly specify rules and regulations in favor of the workers and that in cases they are not transferred to the CHED, they shall maintain with the DECS without losing their seniority rights. From Section 18 of RA 7722 alone it is established that powers from the DECS were transferred to the CHED, thus giving the CHED the power to act, and implement rules and regulations. B. Whether or not the order to prohibit the increase of tuition fee by the Commission on Higher Education is valid. Now that it is established that the power of DECS was indeed transferred to the CHED.
It is clear that CHED will have all the power to govern the higher education or the tertiary education. However, the issue whether the order to prohibit the increase of tuition fee is valid, still remains. To determine whether the order issued is valid or invalid, the author researched on the law governing the powers of the Secretary of Education, and as well researched on Jurisprudence that dealt with question of the validity of the order of the Secretary of Education. In the search for the laws governing the power of the Secretary of Education, the researcher found two laws that gave the Secretary of Education the authority to regulate the increase on tuition fees. The first law being from SEC.
2 of PD No. 451. “The Secretary of Education and Culture has the authority to regulate any increase or change in the rate of tuitions and or other school fees or charges collected from pupils or students and/or their parents by all private schools, colleges, and universities” Also in SEC. 57 and 70 of Batasang Pambansa Blg. 232 or otherwise known as the Education Act of 1982 the same is mentioned. In Sec.
57 paragraph 3 it states that “the Ministry shall promulgate rules and regulations necessary for the administrations, supervision and regulation of the educations system in accordance with declared party.” And Sec. 70 states “The Minister of Educatoin and Culture, charged with the administration and enforcement of this Act, shall promulgate the necessary implementing rules and regulation.” From the provisions stated above namely Sec. 2 of PD No. 451, SEC 57 (3) and SEC 70 of BP No. 232, the secretary of education which in this case is the CHED is given the authority to indeed regulate the tuition fee of the higher education, and thus, the order of prohibiting the increase of tuition fee for the school year 2001-2002 is valid.
Furthermore, the author consulted the jurisprudence to be sure that the order given by the CHED is indeed valid. In the case of Jose D. Lina Jr., petitioner, vs Isidro D. Carino in his capacity as Secretary of Education, Culture, and Sports, respondent, where the petitioner was questioning the authority of the secretary of education in his issuance of DECS order No. 30 whereby it outlines the rate of increase in tuition which all schools should follow. The issue was “whether DECS order no.
30 is valid, that is, whether respondent DECS secretary has the legal authority to issue DECS order no. 30 prescribing guidelines concerning increases in tuition and other school fees.” The court basing the facts on the case of Philippine Consumers Foundation, Inc. vs. the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, maintained that the DECS order No. 30 was indeed valid and thus, should be implemented by the schools.
It followed that “since no other government agency was vested with the authority to fix the maximum school fees, that power should be considered with the DECS Secretary.” With this as a fact on the Jurisprudence of the Philippines, thereby, the Secretary of Education indeed has the authority to regulate the rate of tuition fees of the schools. The secretary of Education in this case being the CHED, as proven in the previous issue that the powers of DECS on the higher Education were transferred to the CHED thereby giving the CHED the power the DECS had before on the higher education. Needless to say, the order issued by the Commission on Higher Education was valid for the reason that the CHED maintains the power to regulate the tuition fees of the school as provided in sec. 2 of PD no. 451, sec. 57(3) and sec.
70 of BP. Blg. No. 232, and lastly the jurisprudence giving the Secretary of Education the authority to regulate the tuition fees of the schools. VII.
Statement of Position and Conclusions Having presented all the facts the author holds that the orders issued by the Commission on Higher Education prohibiting the increase of tuition fee for the school year 2001-2002 valid. The order is valid because the Commission on Higher Education had the authority to regulate the rate of tuition fee as prescribed in the Presidential Decree No. 451 and Batasang Pambansa blg. 232. Moreover, it is prescribed in the constitution that education should be made accessible to all the citizens of the Philippines, and that the state shall ensure that the citizens are given access to a better education.
With the order of the CHED in prohibiting the increase of the tuition fee, it was ensured that this right under the constitution is not infringed, as the administrative body of the government took step to ensure that the citizens will not be deprived in access to education by prohibiting the increase of the tuition fees especially at the time when the citizens are having financial difficulty. Furthermore, in the Higher education modernization act of 1997 it is further specified under section 4 (e) of the act that a socialized scheme in determining the rate of tuition fee. It specifically states that the tuition fee should provide “greater access to the poor”, thus in this case, issuing an order prohibiting the increase of tuition fee for the year 2001-2002 is beneficiary to the poor and will provide them with a greater access as the issue of the CHED was to ensure that education does not become burdensome to parents who experience financial difficulty. Lastly, the jurisprudence of the Philippines had shown that the authority to issue and order regarding the regulation on the tuition fees rests in the hands of the Secretary of Education which in this case is the CHED. In both cases presented above, the court had affirmed that the Secretary of Educations indeed has the right to regulate the tuition fee of the schools. VIII.